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RECENT ILLINOIS DECISIONS
APPEAL AND ERROR--REvIEW-WHETHER OR NOT IT IS REVERSIBLE
ERROR FOR DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL, IN A PERSONAL INJURY SUIT, TO IN-
FORM THE JURY THAT THE DEFENDANT IS NOT COVERED BY INSURANCE--
The plaintiff, in the recent case of Humkey v. Huestmarnn Quarry, Inc.,'
sued to recover for personal injuries sustained in a motor vehicle col-
lision. Counsel for defendant, during his opening statement, informed
the jury that the defendant was not covered by insurance. The plaintiff
objected to this remark and moved for a mistrial, but the trial court over-
ruled the objection and denied the motion. The jury thereafter rendered
a verdict in favor of the defendant and judgment was granted thereon.
The plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court for the Fourth District,
claiming error in the ruling aforementioned. The Appellate Court agreed
that error had been committed and, reversing the judgment, remanded
the case for further proceedings.
Illinois courts, because of the potential prejudice likely to exist, have
generally held that it is error for a plaintiff to introduce evidence that
a defendant involved in a personal injury case is insured against liability
for harm done.2 The only exception to that rule would seem to be one
which permits the interrogation of prospective jurors, after a proper
showing, as to a possible financial connection with an insurance company
or companies,8 since an answer thereto might reveal cause for challenge.
The instant case is of particular importance because it represents the first
time, with the possible exception of the decision in Smith v. Raup,4 that
a reviewing court of Illinois has been called upon to determine the oppo-
site type of situation, one in which the defendant seeks to inform the
jury that he was not covered by insurance. The court based its holding
1343 111. App. 377, 99 N. E. (2d) 351 (1951).
2 Smithers v. Henriquez, 368 Ill. 588, 15 N. E. (2d) 499 (1938), noted in 16
CHICAGo-KENT REvIEw 371; Kavanaugh v. Parret, 379 Il. 273, 40 N. E. (2d) 500
(1942), noted in 20 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REviEw 371; Kelly v. Call, 324 Ill. App. 143,
57 N. E. (2d) 501 (1944).
3 Edwards v. Hill-Thomas Lime & Cement Co., 378 Ill. 180, 37 N. E. (2d) 801
(1941); Bellomy v. Bruce, 303 Ill. App. 349, 25 N. E. (2d) 428 (1939). But see
Wheeler v. Rudick, 397 Ill. 438, 74 N. E. (2d) 601 (1947), noted in 36 Ill. B. J. 250.
4 296 Ill. App. 171, 15 N. E. (2d) 939 (1938). The defendant there was called by
the plaintiff as an adverse witness and, during the course of this examination, he
testified, without objection, that after the accident plaintiff had asked him if he
carried insurance. Upon direct examination, defendant testified that, when plaintiff
had asked him this question, be had replied in the negative. The Appellate Court
for the Second District held that no reversible error had occurred. There is dictum
in the opinion which might seem to indicate that the court favored the idea of
having a defendant inform the jury that he possessed no insurance. Even if error
had occurred, plaintiff was in no position to complain since he had invited the same.
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on the theory that to permit introduction of the question of the presence
or absence of insurance into a personal injury action necessarily places
one party under a handicap and gives to the other an advantage, which
handicap and advantage have no place in the trial of a case. The deci-
sion represents no more than a logical extension of the rule previously
noted as to plaintiffs. It leaves the fundamental policy question, one
concerning whether or not it would be appropriate to make the insurance
carrier a party defendant in every such case, untouched to await legisla-
tive consideration.
CHARITIES--CNSTRUCTION, ADMINISTRATION AND ENFORCEMENT-
WHETHER OR NOT FUNDS OBTAINED BY A CHARITABLE ORGANIZATION
THROUGH LLvy Or ASSESSMENTS AND DUES CONSTITUTE NON-CHARITABLE
FUNDS-In the late case of Slenker v. Gordon,1 the plaintiff sued the Grand
Lodge of the State of Illinois of the Independent Order of Odd Fellows
to recover for personal injuries sustained when his automobile was struck
by another car negligently driven by Gordon who, at the time of the acci-
dent, was performing duties for the corporate defendant within the scope
of his agency. Judgment for the corporate defendant, notwithstanding a
verdict for the plaintiff, was entered by the trial court on the ground that
the Grand Lodge was a charitable corporation possessed solely of trust
funds, hence was immune to judgment. The Appellate Court for the
Second District, on the record before it in an appeal taken by the plain-
tiff, affirmed such judgment. Counsel for the plaintiff had admitted that
the corporate defendant was created solely for charitable purposes, thereby
recognizing the immunity extended in Illinois to the trust funds of such
organizations. It was his contention, however, that certain of the funds
of the corporate defendant, having been raised by assessment imposed
upon its members under penalty of expulsion if not paid, could not be
classified as a part of the charitable funds. The Appellate Court held
that it was not the source from which the fund was derived, nor the man-
ner of its acquisition, which was to be deemed important but that'it was
the end purpose to which the fund was to be devoted that controlled the
issue. As the funds in question were ultimately to inure to the benefit of
charity, except that part necessary to pay the administration expenses,
it was held that they came within the scope of the immunity.
In the earlier Illinois case of Moore v. Moyle,2 where another charit-
able organization had been sued for the negligence of one of its employees,
the Illinois Supreme Court circumscribed the immunity theory by finding
1344 Ill. App. 1, 100 N. E. (2d) 354 (1951). Leave to appeal has been denied.
2 405 Ill. 555, 92 N. E. (2d) 81 (1950).
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the charity in question to be possessed of non-charitable assets consisting
of the proceeds of certain liability insurance policies. Following upon
that decision, there was an expression of some degree of belief that Illinois
courts would begin to designate other funds, such as general operating
funds or moneys collected by way of assessment of mandatory fees, as
being "noncharitable, "3 or might even join the modern trend now turning
in the direction of liability, rather than immunity, for wrongdoing.'
The decision in the Slenker case, together with denial of leave to ap-
peal therein, would tend to belie that hope, for it would seem as if all
funds of a charitable institution are to be considered exempt from tort
liability if those funds, no matter how raised, are to be utilized for the
furtherance of the general charitable purposes of the organization. Few
other cases exist on this point, but two holdings, one from Georgia and
one from Tennessee, have passed on the issue. In the Georgia case of
Morton v. Savannah Hospital,5 it was said that if a hospital receives, or
has due to it, money from paying patients, such money does not consti-
tute part of the charitable trust fund. The Tennessee case of Hammond
Post v. Willis6 would subject all general operating funds to execution.
These cases would, at least, give heed to the source of the funds, separating
those paid under compulsion from those voluntarily donated to the charity.
7
In the light of the instant case, since the typical Illinois charitable or elee-
mosynary organization utilizes all cash receipts in the furtherance of its
charitable purpose, after extracting enough to pay its operating expenses,
about the only potential non-trust asset such an organization could be
said to possess would take the form of insurance coverage. In the absence
thereof, there would seem to be little hope of securing a recovery from the
corporate charity.
3 DeFeo and Spencer, "After Moore v. Moyle: Then What?" 29 CHiCAGo-KENT
LAw REVIEw 107 (1951), particularly p. 117.
4 The recent case of Haynes v. Presbyterian Hospital Association, 241 Iowa 1269,
45 N. W. (2d) 151 (1950), represents a complete reversal of the doctrine previously
followed in Iowa. Even more recently, in Durney v. St. Francis Hospital, Inc.,
- Dela. Super. -, 83 A. (2d) 753 (1951), a court of that state was asked, for the
first time, to consider and adopt the immunity doctrine but refused to accept or
apply it. The states of New Mexico and South Dakota would appear to be the only
ones left in which the issue has not yet been raised: 28 CHICAGo-KENT LAW RELIEw
107 at 109, particularly note S.
5 148 Ga. 438, 96 S. E. 887 (1918).
6179 Tenn. 226, 165 S. W. (2d) 78 (1942).
7 In Summers v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 335 Ill. 546, 167 N. E. 777 (1929), it
was said that a "school charging tuition or fees" did not, thereby, lose its character
as a "charitable institution." See also Hogan v. Chicago Lying-In Hospital, 335 Ill.
42, 166 N. E. 461 (1929). Charity, however, has generally come to be regarded as
the free-will offering or donation of money or services.
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CRIMINAL LAW-EiDENCE--WHETHER OR NOT THE REsuLTs OF A
BREATH TEST To DETERMINE THE PRESENCE OF INTOXICATION WOULD BE
ADMISSIBLE OPINION EVIDENCE IN A CRIMINAL CASE-The Appellate Court
for the First District, in the recent case of People v. Bobezyk,1 was con-
fronted with a question concerning the admissibility in evidence of expert
testimony based on the result of a test performed on a device known as a
Harger Drunkometer, one used to test the alcoholic content of the sub-
ject's breath. The defendant there involved had been charged with driving
an automobile while intoxicated. He appeared to have voluntarily sub-
mitted to the Harger test, which test revealed a sufficiently high concen-
tration to support the belief that the defendant was then intoxicated. At
the trial on such charge, the defendant contended that the results of the
test were inadmissible evidence as the device used had not received general
scientific recognition as providing an accurate index of the amount of
alcohol in the blood. After testimony as to the underlying theory of the
test and of its probabilities of accuracy, given by the inventor and by a
toxicologist, the trial court admitted the evidence and the defendant was
convicted. On his appeal, the Appellate Court for the First District af-
firmed the conviction, stating that any lack of unanimity of the medical
profession as to whether or not the presence, and degree, of intoxication
could be determined from a person's breath went to the weight and not
to the admissibility of expert testimony based on such a breath test.
The problem presented appears to be the first of its kind to be passed
upon by a reviewing tribunal in Illinois and there is very little authority
to be found in other jurisdictions. What few reported cases exist seem
to provide a definite split of opinion over the subject. In the Texas case
of McKay v. State,2 cited by the court as authority, the results of the
Harger test were there admitted upon the same ground as stated in the
principal case. In the Michigan case of People v. Morse,3 however, the
results of the test were excluded on the basis that the test lacked general
scientific recognition to date. It would be difficult to formulate a general
rule on the point, in view of the limited number of cases, but there would
seem to be a trend toward admitting the results of various tests relating
to alcoholism4 in the absence of a possible objection on constitutional
grounds because of the element of self-incrimination involved in ad-
1 343 Il. App. 504, 99 N. E. (2d) 567 (1951). An extensive study of various tests
relating to intoxication appears in Ladd and Gibson, "The Medico-Legal Aspects of
the Blood Test to Determine Intoxication," 24 Iowa L. Rev. 191 (1939).
2- Tex. -, 235 S. W. (2d) 173 (1950).
a325 Mich. 270, 38 N. W. (2d) 322 (1949).
4 See annotation in 127 A. L. R. 1513 to Kuroske v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 234 Wis.
394, 291 N. W. 384 (1940).
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ministering the test. This last objection had been raised in the cases of
State v. Morkrid5 and State v. Duquid but in each instance the objection
had been overruled as the record did not sustain the contention that the
test had been coerced.
During the past fifty years there has been a noticeable inclination
on the part of courts to admit into evidence the results of scientific tests
designed to aid in the proof of criminal cases. Among forms of evidence
now recognized are tests based on fingerprints, 7 palm prints,8 ballistics
studies," microanalysis, 10 and photomicrographs."1 In the light thereof it
would not seem unreasonable to utilize scientific tests tending to prove the
presence of intoxication provided a proper foundation is laid through a
showing of the probability of accuracy, a demonstration that the results
have been diligently and carefully recorded, and provided also it is made
apparent that the defendant has voluntarily submitted to the test. 2
JOINT TENANCY-SEVERANCE-WHETHER OR NOT A JUDGMENT SALE
OF THE INTEREST OF ONE JOINT TENANT WILL OPERATE TO SEVER THE
JOINT TENANCY PRIOR TO THE EXPIRATION OF THE PERIOD OF REDEMPTION-
In the recent case of Jackson v. Lacey,' the Illinois Supreme Court dealt
with the effect, prior to the period of redemption, of a bailiff's sale of the
interest of one joint tenant, pursuant to a judgment lien which had at-
tached thereto. The purchaser, who was the other joint tenant, received
a certificate of purchase, but died before the period of redemption had
expired and a deed could be issued. Thereafter, the first joint tenant,
whose interest had been sold, quitclaimed his rights to the defendant. A
suit for partition brought by the plaintiffs, heirs-at-law of the deceased
judgment purchaser, was dismissed by the trial court. Appeal was taken
directly to the Supreme Court, which affirmed the decree of the trial court,
holding that the unities of title were not destroyed so long as a right to
possession remained, and that the joint tenancy had not been severed by a
5- Iowa - 286 N. W. 412 (1939).
6 50 Ariz. 276, 72 P. (2d) 435 (1937).
7 People v. Jennings, 252 Ill. 534, 96 N. E. 1077 (1911).
8 State v. Kuhl, 42 Nev. 185, 175 P. 190 (1918).
9 People v. Fisher, 340 Il. 216, 172 N. E. 743 (1930).
10 People v. Wallage, 353 Ill. 185, 175 P. 190 (1918).
11 People v. McDonald, 365 Ill. 233, 6 N. E. (2d) 182 (1936).
12 The defendant in the principal case contended that the test was not voluntarily
taken, hence the use of the evidence amounted to a denial of his privilege against
self-incrimination. The court disposed of the point on the ground that the defend-
ant, by taking the case to the Appellate Court and by assigning error over which
that court had jurisdiction, had waived the constitutional question. On that score,
see People v. Terrill, 362 Ill. 61, 192 N. E. 734 (1935).
1408 Ill. 530, 97 N. E. (2d) 839 (1951).
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judicial sale which had not yet materialized into a valid deed of the
debtor's interest.
Previously, the court had held that a joint tenancy would not be
severed by the mere attachment of a judgment lien upon the interest of
one joint tenant,2 or by a levy thereon,3 but that severance would result
through the issuance of a sheriff's deed,' or through a compulsory transfer
under a request for specific performance.5 By its decision in the instant
case, the court has now substantially narrowed, for Illinois, the confines
within which the relationship of joint tenancy will be destroyed through
the process of enforcing a judgment upon the interest of one of the tenants.
There is reason to believe that, in this state, nothing short of the expira-
tion of the period of redemption and the issuance of a deed will suffice to
destroy the joint arrangement.
SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTs--PuBLIC SCHOOLs-WHETHER THOSE
ENGAGED IN TRANSPORTATION OF SCHOOL CHILDREN TO AND FROM SCHOOL
MUST EXERCISE THE HIGHEST DEGREE OF CARE FOR SAFETY OF PUPILS CON-
VEYED-In the case of Van Cleave v. Itlini Coach Company,' the plaintiff, a
school child, had been injured while a non-paying passenger on defend-
ant's bus when, due to a sudden lurch of the bus, another child passenger
was thrown upon the plaintiff. The defendant carrier operated under a
contract with the school district to carry its pupils to and from school.
The prime issue in the case concerned the degree of care required of, the
defendant carrier in transporting children, the defendant relying on the
claim that its duty was to exercise no more than ordinary care. The trial
court, however, found the defendant guilty of negligence and, on appeal,
the Appellate Court for the Third District affirmed the decision.
As a general rule, courts have consistently held that private carriers
are guilty of negligence, causing actionable injury to their passengers, only
when they have not exercised ordinary care.2  Common carriers, on the
other hand, have always been required to exercise the highest degree of
care in the transportation of their passengers.3 In the instant case, the
2 People's Trust & Savings Bank v. Haas, 328 Ill. 468, 160 N. E. 85 (1928).
3Van Antwerp v. Horan, 390 Ill. 449, 61 N. E. (2d) 358 (1945), noted in 24
CHICAGO-KENT LAw REVIEw 205.
4 Johnson v. Muntz, 364 Ill. 482, 4 N. E. (2d) 826 (1936).
5 Spadoni v. Frigo, 307 Ill. 32, 138 N. E. 226 (1923).
1344 Ill. App. 175, 100 N. E. (2d) 398 (1951).
2 Payne v. Halstead, 44 Ill. App. 97 (1892). But see also Ii. Rev. Stat. 1949,
Vol. 2, Ch. 95%, § 58a, as to liability for injury to a non-paying guest automobile
rider.
3 Coulton v. Illinois Central R. Co., 264 Ill. 414, 106 N. E. 1049 (1914).
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court likened the duty of persons engaged in the transportation of school
children to be the equivalent of that imposed on common carriers. Lack-
ing any precedent in Illinois bearing directly on this point, the court
turned to the Washington case of Webb v. City of Seattle4 for support.
It is important to note that in neither the instant case nor in the Wash-
ington case does the court support the conclusion attained with any rea-
soning leading to a belief that those engaged in the transportation of
school children should be held to the highest degree of care. In fact, in
the instant case, the court goes so far as to state that whether the defend-
ant was a common or private carrier was not to be deemed a controlling
feature. If there is justification for this departure from a long-established
distinction, it must, in all probability, lie in the fact that the court felt
the very nature of the occupation, to-wit: carriage of school children,
particularly those of tender years, called for the exercise of the highest
degree of care. In all events, the decision, if upheld, would seem to open
the door to the possibility of bringing cases involving the transportation
of other varied classes of passengers under this unique rule. If so,
economic and other factors which have supported prior classifications,
with their attendant duties, will no longer afford sufficient ground for the
making of future distinctions as to the bases for liability.
WILLS--RIGHTS AND LIABILrrIEs OF DEIisEEs AND LEGATEES-
WHETHER OR NOT A SPOUSE, BY CONTINUING TO ACT AS EXECUTOR AFTER
RENOUNCING THE WILL, HAS WAIVED THE RENUNCIATION TH=Eo--The
testatrix, in the case of In re Donovan's Estate,' provided that her husband
should be one of three named executors and further that he should be
given certain bequests and devises. The husband, shortly after being
appointed co-executor, filed a renunciation of the will but continued to
act as co-executor. Subsequently the other co-executors filed a partial re-
port in which they alleged that the husband, by continuing to act as co-
executor, had waived his prior renunciation. The probate court sustained
the husband's objections and dismissed the report. Upon appeal to the
circuit court, for trial de novo, the partial report was approved. On
direct appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court because a freehold was in-
volved, the decision of the circuit court was reversed and the report was
dismissed, the court holding that the husband's action in continuing to act
as executor had not operated to nullify the renunciation of the will.
The court, in arriving at the foregoing conclusion, first ascertained
that the effect of a renunciation was to reject the beneficial provisions of
422 Wash. (2d) 596, 157 P. (2d) 312 (1945).
1409 Il. 195, 98 N. E. (2d) 757 (1951).
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the will and to treat the same as if they had been obliterated therefrom, 2
for the statute provides that the renunciation shall operate to bar the
spouse from any claim under the beneficial provisions of the will.' Such
being the consequence of a renunciation, it has been uniformly held that,
once filed, the renunciation must stand and may be withdrawn only by
order of court.4  The query in the case, therefore, became one as to whether
or not the husband had engaged in such a series of acts as would warrant
a court in arriving at the conclusion that the renunciation should be
ordered withdrawn by reason of an estoppel growing from the husband's
conduct in serving as co-executor. In that regard, the court indicated
that the husband was related to the will in question in two different
capacities, to-wit: as beneficiary and as executor. Conduct in one capacity,
that is by way of renunciation filed by him as beneficiary, could not oper-
ate to create an estoppel against the same individual in his different
capacity as executor, particularly since no one was harmed, as to the
latter capacity, by anything done in relation to the former. To support
a claim of estoppel, of course, it must appear that the conduct relied on
invoked some form of harm.' If the husband, in his capacity as husband,
had obtained more than he would have been legally entitled to receive,
there would have been some basis for the assertion of an estoppel, for
injury would then be apparent.' As, however, he gained a right to nothing
beyond his statutory share, no injury had been done. Anything claimed
by him in his capacity as co-executor, such as commissions and the like,
would come to him by right of law rather than under the will, hence would
amount to no more than a proper expense of administration, which could
afford no basis for a claim of estoppel.
While there can probably be no criticism addressed either to the
reasoning followed or to the result attained, the decision suggests the ad-
visability of using appropriate language in a will to offset the possibility
of a spouse electing to renounce the beneficial provisions thereof yet in-
sisting on the right to serve in the capacity of executor in case he or she
should have been so designated. If that is not what the testator desires, a
few words would serve to disable the renouncing spouse from acting in
any capacity under the will.
2 Sueske v. Schofield. 376 Ill. 431, 34 N. E. (2d) 399 (1941).
3 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, § 169.
4 Hanson v. Clark, 246 Ill. App. 496 (1927). See also 14 Am. Jur., Dower, p. 781.
5 Canavan v. McNulty, 328 Ill. 388, 159 N. E. 782 (1927).
6 Kerner v. Peterson, 368 Ill. 59, 12 N. E. (2d) 884 (1937).
